Ninety eight years ago, Roscoe Pound delivered to an American Bar Association meeting an address on out legal system. In that address, which was still being celebrated by professional leaders fifty years later, Pound argued that popular dissatisfaction with the legal system could be cured by procedural reform, and he had a list of reforms in mind.
3 doesn't follow that a trial rate of 2% is a national crisis, or that we would be better off as a nation or a profession if we returned to the one-in-five rate that prevailed a few decades after Pound's polemic. 4 Whether the decline of trials points to pathology or to a different form of homeostasis depends on what we want the civil litigation system to do and how we think it ought to be financed. Those questions, not just the trial rate, should be the focus of broad attention.
This paper offers an explanatory hypothesis--that the present state of civil trials results from the convergence of two developments:
• first, what we asked for--a century of procedural reform and changes in the legal profession incorporating the consensus of some very thoughtful people;
• second, what we paid for--a half century of evolution in the demography and economy of the bar.
Having got what we asked for and paid for, we are now soberly assessing the results.
Such an assessment and any proposals for change will, be better if we understand more completely why we stand where we do today and, if we don't like the current state of affairs, whether we would like even less changes that might produce a higher trial rate.
I. Appreciating Galanter
A first approach to this topic requires that we appreciate the significant contribution Marc Galanter has made to our understanding. He has marshaled all the data, and in the process has demonstrated several points that bear underlining, if only because several of them diverge not only from popular wisdom but even from the understandings of generally well-informed observers.
First, Galanter presents good data in ways that do not jump too quickly from the descriptive to the normative; this is a great virtue. And, to the limited extent to which it is possible, he does not assume that the only data is the federal data, thus missing the 4 98% of the cases tried in the states. One of the important things revealed by this state court data is that, while the state court trends run in the same direction as the federal data, the number and the proportion of state court trials are significantly higher than in federal courts. In the years for which Galanter has data, the state trial rate ranged from a high of 34% to a low of 14%--at all times maintaining a rate not only higher but higher by a multiple of the federal trial rate. 5 I return to this point later because whether one thinks of the present federal trial rate as a pathology or an achievement, the state data offer a point of comparison and a basis for thinking about which features produce which results.
Second, Galanter runs his trial numbers not just against filings but against other relevant indices, including most notably those involving population and GDP, revealing that litigation rates are keeping pace with population and are lagging far behind economic growth, a point that has escaped some otherwise sophisticated observers. To reinforce
Galanter's data, consider a very crude chart that tracks the comparison between population, civil filings, and gross domestic product in the U.S., using the much larger universe of state court filings as the yardstick: C iv il F ilin g s P o p u la t io n G D P ( c o n s t a n t $ )
These data tell us two things that bear on Galanter's argument. Crudely, they tell us that litigation is growing just slightly faster than population, emphasizing that a fall in trial rates does not come from a fall in litigation rates. More important, they tell us that civil litigation is growing much more slowly than economic activity. Because civil litigation 6 typically correlates strongly with economic development, 7 it is important for those who design and operate civil litigation systems to understand that in this respect not only trials but civil filings are substantially lagging one obvious correlate. That lag has implications for the design of policy as well. For legislators wondering whether litigation is out of control, these two comparison points suggest not: measured either against population or economic activity, litigation rates are either holding steady or declining.
Finally, though less directly, Marc Galanter's data provides confirming evidence of the confluence of two long-term trends in civil litigation in the twentieth century. The numbers illustrate the effect of changes in procedural design and of changes in litigation finance. In procedural design, we have got what we wished for; in litigation finance we have got what we paid for.
II. Getting What We Asked For
The quotation from Roscoe Pound at the top of this paper captured not only his views of trial but in many respects the agenda of thoughtful procedural reformers in the twentieth century. Trials, especially in the common law tradition, are in many respects "wasteful:" they produce a victor, but at great cost to both sides and to the public. To quote a pair of more contemporary observers, "a trial is a failure."
8 Moreover, at the start of the twentieth century trials often produced a victor on the basis of incomplete information about the historical facts underlying the dispute. In many respects the procedural agenda of the century just past has sought to change these features--which were flaws in the eyes of the reformers. And we have done so--so completely that we now worry about the results.
A. Procedural Reform in the Twentieth Century 7
Writing fifteen years ago, Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud gracefully summarized the guiding principles of procedural reform in the twentieth century:
With some notable exceptions [most of whom, the authors noted, were academics], lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial.
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Procedural reform in the twentieth century reflected this belief. It did so in four ways, all
of which incorporate what one might call a Progressive version of procedure: the belief in facts rather than law, the belief in information rather than argument, and the belief in broad rather than narrow focus for disputing, and a belief in agreement rather than adjudicated conflict. The central procedural changes of the twentieth century reflected these beliefs. They diminished the role of pleading, greatly expanded the mechanisms of pretrial discovery and role of expert witnesses, and enabled broad joinder.
Each of these changes should have affected trial rates. By lowering pleading barriers, the designers of procedural rules raised the number of plausible filings. This is not a small point. Even if we had held all other aspects of the system constant, by relaxing pleading requirements we would have increased the number of filings relative to the number of cases with sufficient merit to reach trial--and thereby dropped the trial rate.
One of the great merits of Galanter's data is that he shows that something more is happening: not just the proportion of cases but the absolute number of cases reaching trial has diminished, teaching us that we need to look further than pleading reforms for an explanation of the data.
The second part of the story is discovery. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the state legislators and rulemakers who followed the pattern established by the federal reforms all believed that it was better to uncover the truth, the whole truth--before trial--and thus to diminish the effect of theatrics and of surprise at trial. 10 Looking at U.S. civil process at the turn of the twentieth century, they concluded that it was not well adapted to the transformed conditions of social and economic life, 9 Id.8 particularly in disputes where one of the parties was a bureaucratic institution, either private or public. And they were probably right. Once a society moves to a culture of record-keeping and complex organizations, sorting out disputed events and responsibilities will become more accurate but take longer. Unlike the civil code nations, the United States had not trained a cadre of elite bureaucrats whose job it was to sort out the facts of civil disputes. Even the elite members of its bar and bench operated within a framework that made it difficult or impossible to pull together substantial bodies of evidence, much of it in the hands of adversaries. That made trials of such cases hard to conduct and too likely to turn on advocates' tricks or surprise witnesses. Before discovery common law trials often denied the parties and the judiciary an opportunity without the pressures of trial to sort through alternative lines of evidence, consider their coherence and to arrive at a thoughtful conclusion about what it meant. Civil law systems put in the hands of the judge the decision about how much factual investigation will occur. 11 Contemporary common law process now enables the parties, and, to a lesser extent, the judge, to do the same sifting because discovery will have unearthed almost everything salient about the case-in addition, we should candidly admit, some things that are not particularly salient. Modern pretrial process was designed to make surprise at trial virtually impossible, 12 and it has largely done so. U.S. litigants have at their disposal an array of devices that, if properly deployed, enable the uncovering of astonishing amounts of information.
These devices have another effect that bears on the phenomenon of the vanishing trial: they place the power of investigation primarily in the hands of the lawyer. At the time Pound wrote, there were cases in which relevant, unprivileged evidence could be uncovered only by the use of a trial subpoena. As a result, there were surely some lawsuits in this era in which trial itself was being used for the purpose of discovery. It is hard to imagine such a case today: anything that could be introduced at trial (as well as a 11 See KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 37-107 (2003) (arguing that the placement of investigative authority in the hands of officials who lack the incentive to investigate yields inadequate factual bases for civil litigation in civil law systems). 12 One can find cases in which relevant, unprivileged evidence that appeared shortly before trial is excluded on the grounds that in modern civil litigation one expects that both sides will know of all the evidence 9 much that cannot be introduced at trial) can be discovered beforehand. But when it is uncovered today, the uncovering occurs at the initiative and under the control of the parties' lawyers, who can at the same time begin to decide whether and how to settle. By privatizing the uncovering of historical facts we have placed new power in the hands of the parties, power they regularly employ to settle their cases without adjudication on the merits.
It is hard to argue with the reformers' goal: historical truth or something like it is an attractive aim, and lawyers' tricks and surprise are not the stuff on which one wants serious decisions to be made. One wants the parties to know beforehand about the prior disciplinary record of the physician accused of malpractice, as well as the hypochondriac tendencies of his patient, the plaintiff. One wants to know the state of the brakes of the defendant's car and of the epileptic seizures of the plaintiff. And this is the stuff of simple litigation. Such preparation is not merely desirable but essential to some cases.
One cannot imagine the development of products liability law or securities litigation or antitrust without the kind of deep discovery permitted by contemporary pretrial discovery and the growth in the use of expert testimony. Maybe more important, civil litigation has emerged as a real, if often controversial, alternative to regulation in the modern economy.
A generation ago bar symposia like these were full of debates about the merits and the techniques of the then-still-new discovery system. Great thrashings about the existence and scope of work product protection, a new emphasis on the doctrines of evidentiary privilege (because they protected the otherwise discoverable), concerns about the conditions under which experts could be deposed, and the like filled professional and to a lesser extent academic literature. REV. 751, 811 (1999) (reporting that the "awards our jurors actually gave tended to be smaller than the awards the judges and lawyers predicted they would give. One might expect the 13 estimates, however flawed, converge. In the absence of discovery the only way to gain some of this information was to go to trial. Otherwise put, in the world before 1938 trial was often the only real way to do discovery, and some of the trials in this earlier era can be seen as in-court efforts to seek information. 23 So, all other things being equal, extensive discovery will lower the trial rates because it produces information.
Fourth, discovery and expert testimony substantially increase costs and require continuing investment. At one level that point is unbearably obvious. I want, however, to argue the less obvious point that those costs may change both parties' calculations about the desirability of settlement and the risks of trial. U.S. litigation usually requires each side to bear its own litigation costs, including most notably discovery and expert witnesses. Insurance companies, who watch litigation costs closely, tell us that law is usually cheap while fact investigation and discovery are usually expensive. Typical retainer agreements for insurer-engaged counsel require the defense lawyer to seek permission from the carrier before taking a deposition, engaging an expert, or seeking any form of expensive discovery. On the plaintiffs' side experienced lawyers listening to a prospective clients' story of an injury will be mentally calculating the extent of investment--in experts, in fact investigation, in discovery--necessary to bring the case to a point where either trial or a credible discovery offer is possible.
These costs are not just a barrier to litigation--though they are certainly that.
They also produce a game of competitive investment. Both parties are trying to "buy" victory by investing in discovery. Discovery may uncover information that will strengthen one's case. Discovery will likely uncover both strengths and weaknesses in the opponent's case. Discovery will almost certainly require a symmetrical investment (2001) (reaching a similar conclusion on the basis of less elaborately analyzed data, reporting "dramatic" differences in the estimates of insurance adjusters, lawyers, and similar persons). 23 That phenomenon persisted for several decades after 1938, in part because the bar took some time to exploit fully the possibility of discovery and in part because there was a lag of some decades before all the states substantially adopted the "Federal" discovery regime. 14 by one's adversary: depositions must be defended; interrogatories must be answered or properly objected to; experts require counter-experts and so on. These discovery and experts' costs mean that as the case progresses, the parties must regularly make decisions about additional investments, and must consider how various litigation events bear on the likely return of investments already made. Classical economic theory tells us that sunk costs should not influence decisions about whether to make further investments: the only thing that should matter, from the stance of cold rationality, is whether additional investment will yield gain. 24 Social psychologists tell us that many of us behave less rationally than this: that sunk costs often cause people to persist in investments beyond the point at which they should. 25 The phenomenon of the vanishing trial displays, I think, both principles at work.
I stress these costs because, although lawyers appreciate them well, some of the academic literature (including some written by me) fails completely to appreciate the role of discovery and expert testimony in producing the propensity to settle. Before discovery, the propensity to settle was largely a matter of balancing size and chance of victory against the size and likelihood of defeat at trial. But little was required by way of continuing pretrial investment, because little could be invested beforehand. Discovery and expert testimony changed that calculation: they not only enabled substantial, continuing pretrial investment but required it. And the staged character of discovery forced litigants regularly to confront the question of whether to continue to invest in the outcome of adjudication.
In making their investment decisions, litigants and lawyers must contend with two added uncertainties: first, the substantive law pushes trial outcomes away from smooth curves and toward bimodality; second, mean and median judgments differ substantially. We know something about the outcome of these opposing characteristics on actual verdicts. Several studies have confirmed the proposition that median verdicts hover around the $40,000 mark, but that a very small right hand tail reflects the six-and seven-figure verdicts that make headlines and reputations. 29 One study of the entire universe of jury verdicts in California for two different years found that between twothirds and three-quarters of all civil damages awarded came in five per cent of the verdicts. 30 As a group, plaintiffs and their lawyers will be investing in litigation with the hope they will prove successful at trial, and, if so, that their verdict will form part of the small right-hand tail that creates the spread between mean and median verdicts. As a group, defendants will be seeking either a total defense verdict or, failing that, a damage award in the median range. The prospect of settlement presents two possibilities. First and most obviously, it ends the need for continuing investment; the balance sheet can be closed. Second, and somewhat more subtly, it shifts control of the outcome into the lawyers' and parties' hands and presents the possibility of smoothing the curve of possible outcomes: negotiations can produce results along an even curve. Settlement thus 27 The exception to this proposition comes in contract claims where damages are either liquidated or otherwise known, as with, for example, a promissory note. 28 In the instance of punitives, the U.S. Supreme Court has presumptively limited punitive awards acceptable under the due process clause to less than ten times the amount of compensatory damages. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424-26 (2003 
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reduces risk in two ways: it attacks both the uncertainty and the bimodality of legal judgments.
The attractions of these features of settlement deserve further exploration after an explanation of a second contributor to the decline in trials. Changing procedural rules and customs may, by themselves, have contributed to the changes reflected in Galanter's data. But they were likely accelerated by changes in the demography, economics, and regulation of the U.S. bar.
III. Getting What We Paid For
The preceding paragraphs, with their emphasis on symmetrical investment by the parties, imply a symmetrical system of litigation finance. Such a system is for many claims and for many parts of the bar now a reality. That symmetry has implications for trial rates. If the ability to invest in discovery and experts were systematically asymmetrical, available in practice only to the defense bar, I believe we would have less settlement and higher trial rates--as we did seventy-five years ago. Changes in litigation finance, in practice patterns, and, to a lesser extent, in professional regulation contribute to the phenomenon of the vanishing trial. An effort to understand--or to alter--the trial rate without reference to these features is therefore likely to fail. The sketch below cannot deeply document these changes. Fortunately most of the changes are uncontroverted. The task is rather to connect these familiar developments with their effect on trial rates. counsel, they typically insist on consultation and specific permission before counsel take steps that have significant financial implications (e.g., engagement of experts, taking of depositions). Because staged pretrial processes will require symmetrical investments, the parties must regularly and specifically confront the question of whether to settle or to continue to invest. Because continued investment depends on capacity, and capacity is likely to be the least well understood of the phenomena under discussion, it is worth brief elaboration.
The U.S. bar has famously grown in size, both in absolute numbers, and on a per capita basis. Just as important has been the change in the size of many of the practice groups. References to mega-firms with hundreds or thousands of lawyers are common parts of the literature and of our students' lives, particularly for those among us whose students and colleagues inhabit the "upper hemisphere" of the bar. To understand the vanishing trial, however, the 2000-lawyer firm is less significant than a more pervasive shift at the other end of practice. Until the most recent decades, most U.S. lawyers were solo practitioners, 35 a group that still comprises about a third of the bar. In the last two decades, however, for the first time more U.S. lawyers were practicing, not alone, but in at least small groups. It is important to stress the small size of these practice groups:
there are far more U.S. lawyers practicing in groups of 5-12 than in groups with more than a hundred lawyers. Recent data from the largest bar in the U.S. give us a sketch of the present and some sense of the future. In 2001 only 35% of active members of the state, almost 70% reported themselves in a practice group that included some other lawyers. 37 For our purposes the change from one to ten lawyers is more important than the change from fifty to two hundred lawyers.
Consider the effect of these changes, starting with the plaintiffs' bar because the changes here are greater and because they drive some of the defense bar shifts.
Capitalization, diversification, and case selection are the keys to this change, and one of the keys to the dropping trial rate. As we have seen, modern litigation will often require significant investments that may not bear fruit for several years. A lawyer representing a plaintiff in an ordinary auto accident case, still the most common civil filing in the U.S., must count on retaining experts to testify concerning the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, including any long-range effects, perhaps about the causes of the accident, perhaps about municipal liability for road design or traffic management. Many of these experts will require retainers for their initial investigation or reports, more investments to depose them and their counterparts--and so on.
Bankrolling such a case (and this is emphatically a simple rather than a complex case) generally will require two things: a line of credit from a lender and several colleagues whose work diversifies the risk for the entire firm. Both phenomena are now common, and they reinforce each other. Banks finance law firms, and lenders will frequently advance more credit when the practice has depth (several lawyers) and diversity (a mix of cases). 38 Practice groups often purposely engage in a range of work, some of which may produce modest but predictable income, part of which can be used to invest in larger, less predictable cases. 39 Alternatively, the firm may specialize in personal injury litigation but have enough lawyers and cases to average risk across the "portfolio," so that there will be a predictable income stream. Compensation for such referrals comes both in the form of referral fees and, just as important, in a future stream of referrals--with the less-well-capitalized practices getting referrals of cases too small for the big fish and the high-end practice getting referrals of large-value, large-investment cases from small practices.
B. Settlement & Trial Dynamics in a Reconfigured Bar
This structure creates a climate of rational risk aversion and a slight preference for settlement in most cases. Once upon a time, the entire plaintiffs' bar had the same characteristics--very little capital and the ability to sort cases into only two categories:
those that would be settled before filing and those they would try to take to trial. The decision to file suit indicated a predisposition to go to trial if they and their clients could hang on that long. Today, many members of this segment of the bar act more like the manager of a diversified stock fund with laddered portfolios. They will invest significant amounts in market research (client screening, referral, and pretrial investment), and construct "litigation portfolios" with a varying characteristics. Some will seek large number of small gains (settlements) and a much smaller number of cases in which they hope they have accomplished the litigation equivalent of buying Microsoft in 1985.
Because these portfolios require continued investment decisions--shall we take another deposition? hire another expert? bring this motion?--these lawyers must continuously decide whether to invest more on the prospects and risks of adjudication or whether to control those risks through settlement. These plaintiffs behave more like large investors than did their predecessors. To put the point another way, the plaintiffs' bar, because of 
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its better capitalization, is now in the position to behave like the defendants, to which we now turn.
The defendants' bar has responded to the plaintiffs' side changes in interesting ways. As was the case seventy-five years ago, most of the defense work will be financed by liability insurers (or by self-insured defendants whose size will cause them to behave much like insurers). The most significant changes grow from the post-war expansion of credit. With this credit, the U.S. population has made two major investments-in housing and in automobiles. Two-thirds of U.S. households now own their housing, and the average U.S. household also owns a fraction more than two automobiles, also purchased on credit. Both investments are overwhelmingly backed by credit, and creditors have insisted on insurance to protect their investment; common prudence, insurance marketing, and, in many states, mandatory auto liability insurance laws have made liability insurance a standard part of such policies. This development, which has accompanied the great credit-linked expansion of the U.S. economy in the past half century, has created broad if sometimes shallow pool of insured defendants. This expansion of liability insurance, itself linked to the extension of consumer credit, has led to an expansion of the defendants' bar.
But with the expansion in this side of the bar has come a new generation of cost controls. So long as insurers could rely on the systematically asymmetric resources of plaintiffs and defendants, they had less need to supervise the expenditures of their retained defense lawyers. Those lawyers would not typically need to spend much, in part because there wasn't a lot to spend on in the days before pretrial discovery and the flowering of experts, and in part because just the threat of significant defense expenditures (coupled with the insurance resources that made such threats credible)
would result in either a defense victory or a modest loss. That changed when the plaintiffs' bar recapitalized itself. Today, many plaintiffs' firms can match defense expenditures dollar for dollar (up to the point of diminishing rationality, an amount determined by the stakes of the case). Insurers have responded to this reality by imposing very tight cost controls. Not only lawyers' fees but also basic litigation decisions, particularly those in the pretrial stage, are subject to carrier control. As already noted, many retainer letters from insurers require carrier permission to engage in significant discovery, to hire an expert, even to do legal research or to file motions beyond the required minimum. In most cases these controls, combined with the recapitalization of the plaintiffs' bar, mean that the parties have essentially equal resources. The insurer will, of course, have absolutely greater resources available to it, but the amounts at stake in the case will make it irrational to deploy those resources, except in the occasional strategic, "we'll-show-them-what-they-are-up-against" case.
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These changes have altered the strategy of settlement, and thus contributed to the vanishing of trial. In a world in which the plaintiff's lawyer had made virtually no investment in pretrial investigation or discovery (perhaps because he could not afford any), trial, if he could hang on that long, was a rational choice: there was a very small chance of winning, but there was little chance of winning without it--and there was little need for continuing investment and the continuing re-evaluation that decision entails. In a world of significant pretrial investment--continuing investment made by both sides--settlement looks different.
C. The Dynamics Illustrated
Some numbers may help. Suppose the most common single form of lawsuit--an auto accident case. The plaintiff has sustained serious injuries in an intersection collision; if permanent, the injuries will require lifetime care, but that diagnosis is uncertain. At the outset of the case plaintiff's lawyer is uncertain about the case for liability: plaintiff and defendant tell different stories, the police report is inconclusive, and there are no known witnesses. The plaintiff's lawyer must make two decisions:
whether the case is worthwhile with any level of investment and, if so, whether her practice group can handle it, given their level of capitalization and present case mix. If the answer to the first question is yes and the second no, the lawyer will need to find a 43 The exception to this symmetry of resources is the bet-the-company case, in which the potential for massive liability from a repeated injury will cause the defendant rationally to make a much larger investment in the individual case than it would, by itself, warrant because of the fear of cascading liability 24 referral among her network of appropriate firms. Assuming either that the first firm can handle it or that it has been successfully referred, a series of investments will follow:
investigators to uncover potential witnesses; in engineering experts to reconstruct the accident (to replace or bolster the incident witnesses), medical experts to estimate the likelihood of lifetime medical injuries, and actuaries to produce reliable estimates of lost wages and medical expenses. The total investment, exclusive of lawyers' time, is likely to run between $75,000 and $100,000, according to my sources.
Let us now turn to the defendant to see how the dynamics might operate. Suppose that defendant and the carrier conclude there is coverage. At a minimum that means the carrier is obliged to defend. An early question will be whether the policy limits are high enough to pay a substantial settlement. If not, the carrier may well make an early tender of the policy limits, to save itself litigation expenses and, equally important, to protect itself from the prospect of a subsequent suit for bad faith failure to settle--a claim that typically carries both compensatory damages (of the amount of the resulting judgment, even if it is larger than the policy limits) and punitives. Typically a plaintiff will accept such a settlement offer if it's clear that there are no non-insurance assets, and, according to some recent work, even if there are non-insurance assets. 44 But for purposes of exposition let us suppose that either the initial policy or an umbrella policy are large enough, and the initial assessment of liability and damages uncertain enough, that the carrier decides it must defend at least into a deeper stage of the litigation. At that point defendant must essentially match plaintiffs' investment decisions, except in the unlikely case it decides that plaintiff is investing foolishly. The defendant must thus make its own symmetrical investments in investigators, experts, and the like. Because the carrier is a bulk purchaser of such professional services, it may be able to obtain them at a slightly lower cost than the plaintiff. But the discount won't be enormous, so let us realistically suppose that the defendant must also make an investment in between $60,000 and $75,000 in experts and the like. Moreover, they must invest these amounts not all at in similar follow-on cases. See, e.g., Stephen C. once, but in stages, and if they are rational, will consider at each stage whether the additional investment (which, we must recall, is an investment toward a return with a very high degree of variability) is worthwhile. Such a situation seems likely to lead many parties toward a decision to settle--even if we take account of what psychologists report is a normal human propensity to throw good money after bad. 45 At this point, the parties, between them have between $130,000 and $175,000 invested in the case, without regard to lawyers' time. But at this point we cannot ignore lawyers' time, because an expert must, at a minimum, produce a report to be disclosed to the other side (and reviewed by the adversary's lawyer) and submit to a deposition which will enable the adversary (and the proponent) to evaluate the strength and credibility of the expert's testimony. Each such deposition must be prepared and defended, and transcribed or recorded. We are, at this point, approaching the level of $200,000 in joint costs, most of which are not in lawyers' time. And recall that those costs have been incurred in a case where the verdict could quite credibly be either $0 or $2,000,000--given the uncertainty about both liability and damages.
Suppose that plaintiff, an experienced and credible lawyer who is known by the carrier to be able to take cases to trial and to win with some regularity, approaches the carrier relatively early, say after both sides have invested something like $30,000 in the case. From experience the defense lawyer will know that plaintiff's lawyer is prepared and able to invest another $70,000--and that the carrier will have to match it--before incurring the even higher expenses of trial. The result of trial, of course, could be a ringing defense victory, but even that would end up costing more than $100,000. Or trial could be a disaster, with $2,000,000 in damages to be added to the $100,000 in litigation expenses. A settlement of $150,000 leaves everyone much better off: the carrier has assured that it won't be left with a very large bill, and will pay just $50,000 more than it would pay in litigation expenses even in the even of total defense victory. Considering the possible exposure from a large verdict, this may look very good. To the plaintiff--and his lawyer--the same may be true. Granted that the $30,000 and the lawyer's fee will 26 have to come off the top, they avoid the possibility of a large additional investment followed by a defense victory, which is the most common outcome of a personal injury trial. 46 Under these circumstances, trial has limited attractions and settlement many.
D. Two Limiting Cases?
But has this scenario explained too much, suggesting that there should be not just few but no trials? The most common solution to this paradox supposes that it occurs because the parties reach substantially different estimates of the trial outcome. Such a proposition is well understood, though accumulating data suggest that the phenomenon may be more widespread and more dramatic than typically suspected, with even experienced lawyers and judges making very poor estimates of outcomes. 47 Another possibility, one closer to our investigation, might involve parties who had made little investment in the pretrial stage. One study of a large sample of such "ordinary" claims found that they typically employed little discovery. 48 Under such conditions, the absence of the requirement to make continuing investments--and the attendant need to reevaluate--might lead parties to behave differently about trial. In the absence of significant investment the defendant will have little incentive to make more than a nuisance offer and the plaintiff will have no need for continuing investment until the eve of trial. There is some evidence from which one can infer that this phenomenon is at work: the state cases go to trial at a higher rate than the federal cases. We know from other studies that federal litigation has, on average, higher stakes, 49 and such stakes are more likely to draw continuing investment, and, with the investment, the requirement that it be regularly reevaluated. So one hypothesis for the difference in the state and federal trial rate is that the former "suffer" from less need for continuing investment and therefore less propensity by both parties to re-evaluate.
at PAGE [Source will take too long to ILL for submission this week]. 46 Gross & Syverud report that a slight majority of personal injury cases that go to trial result in a complete defense victory. REV. 433, 438 (1996) .
One category of federal claims may also fit this profile, and it is a category where Galanter's data indicate a rising number of trials: civil rights litigation. The civil rights bar, my anecdotal evidence suggests, is less well capitalized than the plaintiffs' personal injury bar. They may typically be in smaller practice groups. The experience with Rule 11 sanctions in the 1980s (before the 1993 revisions) suggests that federal judges, at least, thought a substantial proportion of these claims were either without merit or, at a minimum, poorly presented. 50 I am entirely aware that some have suggested reasons for this experience other than the merits of these claims. My thesis is consistent with either view. I am suggesting that this segment of the plaintiffs' bar is behaving much more like the entire plaintiffs' bar did in the first half or three-quarters of the twentieth century:
they are bringing large numbers of underinvested claims, some of which are strong, some of which are weak, and some of which would be strong if the bar had were sufficiently well-capitalized to make the requisite investment. Because there's only modest pretrial investment, the optimal plaintiffs' strategy is to fight and claw, hoping to reach the promised land of trial. And Galanter's data suggest that a number of these cases do reach that land--a higher proportion than of cases where, for other reasons, we suspect better-capitalized plaintiffs' lawyers.
The argument, then, is that the apparent exceptions to the low-trial hypothesis involve two sets of claims with a similar characteristic: relatively low levels of continuing investment. In the state claims this characteristic may flow from the nature of the claims themselves--many factually simple, with damage amounts too low to justify substantial discovery. In the civil rights cases, my hypothesis is that, while some of the cases might justify higher investment levels, other the lawyers bringing many of those claims have characteristics that make than avatars--throwbacks to an earlier era of civil litigation. If this is correct, an interesting question is why the bar in this area has not capitalized itself as well or elaborately as the rest of the plaintiffs' bar, in spite of the existence of fee-shifting statutes designed to attract claimants' lawyers to this area of practice. 51 One reason may be the relative immaturity of these claims: several decades 50 Burbank cite 51 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1988(b).
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old, civil rights claims are still relative newcomers on the block, and it may take somewhat longer for the plaintiffs' bar to figure out the right way to invest and prosecute them efficiently. Second, many of these claims are either uninsured or uninsurable, which makes judgments more difficult to collect at the back end of litigation, particularly against smaller employers. An insurance company may put up a big fight, but it is finally in the business of paying claims, and they will do so regularly and reliably (though not happily) when they lose. Tom Baker has taught us that many plaintiffs' lawyers do not relish the prospect of collecting from non-insurance assets. 52 Third, many of the employment claims may be small: most back pay awards simply do not have enough zeros after them to justify the deep investment necessary to litigate them properly. Still, in the face of all these hypotheses, I am certain only that there is at least a small mystery:
in theory, the existence of fee-shifting statutes should enable a group of competent and properly capitalized lawyers to assemble a sufficiently broad portfolio of claims to make a paying proposition of it. One of the many values of Galanter's data is that it points us to the right questions to investigate.
IV. Not Liking What We Got?
The title of this symposium is admirably non-judgmental. It neither assumes that a low trial rate represents Nirvana nor that it constitutes a national emergency. That is the right stance to take. But it is also worth examining some of the reasons why one might be concerned about such a trial rate and what one might do if one were. The interesting question is not whether the sky is falling but how best to assess this phenomenon in a thoughtful way, recognizing that trial rates are part of a larger system involving not just trial rules and rates but financing systems, risk pools, the demography of the legal profession, and even the incidence of home and automobile ownership. I begin by examining alternative and, I believe, equally plausible views of the vanishing trial, one in which it is a natural and desirable sign of the maturation of the procedural system and another in which it is a threat to a core political value.
A. What's Not to Like?
The Good?
52 See Baker, supra note 44.
29
Consider first the proposition that the glass is half full. This is a story of the largely successful privatization of civil justice, one that runs along the same lines as the virtual privatization of land title and registration through the institution of title insurance.
Other contributions to this symposium have explored other forms of privatization--the perhaps expanded use of arbitration and other "private" procedural systems. Resort to such systems will reduce not only trial rates but also filing rates, since arbitrated cases will not be filed at all--except when one of the parties seeks to compel arbitration. The form of privatization on which I am focusing keeps the case within the legal system but moves the expenses that might once have been publicly borne onto the parties. The changes in bar structure and capitalization have created, for many of the most common claims, a system of claims-clearance that shifts most of the costs of dispute resolution away from the state to the disputing parties.
Moreover, as compared to 1925 or 1950, the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars are relatively evenly matched. (Indeed, if you listen to some segments of political opinion, the plaintiffs' bar overmatches the defense bar.) Both sides are able to invest in litigation in a rational way, with two results--the overall cost of litigation is higher, and the information and tactical weaponry available to the two sides are relatively even. That is an important achievement, one that, in principle, makes civil litigation an imaginable alternative to regulatory and administrative supervision of economic life. Put otherwise, those who support the deregulation of the economy should be pleased that there is a robust bar able to resort to civil litigation as an alternative to regulatory supervision.
That privatization enables the United States to support a high (though not, on a per capita basis, the highest) 53 level of civil litigation with a relatively low level of public investment in judicial officers. In the U.S. the state and federal systems combined employ about one judicial officer per 25,000 population; in Germany the figure is about one per 5,000. Neither system is inherently better, but if we wished to have a higher trial rate, it would be important to understand the extent of additional public resources that 30 such a change would require. As things stand, the privatization of costs combines with the high rate of settlement to keep most litigation costs private.
If one puts this point historically, one can see the legal system during the New
Deal as faced with a choice. Like the national economy generally, it could have taken a road of regulatory bureaucratization, with much deeper investments in judges, and perhaps changes in procedural rules to give more responsibility for fact investigation to public rather than private agents. We did just that with the New Deal administrative state, and it continues to be the model in a number of areas of governmental activity.
Modern procedural regimes in the U.S. have taken a different path. We have designed a system that enables probing investigation of facts in civil litigation accompanied by relatively little public expense or official involvement. That regime can produce unsightly instances of lawyers behaving as if they had spent an insufficient amount of time in kindergarten and large amounts of money wasted either in excessive discovery or in stonewalling. But the system also produces a comparatively astonishing amount of information at very low public cost. The private cost of the information and the information itself lead to a low trial rate. From one standpoint, all this is a remarkable accomplishment, even if it is an inadvertent one.
The Bad?
The glass may, however, be not half full but half empty. There's a traditional--and strong--argument that adjudication, particularly jury adjudication, is an important democratic value. It not only assures that the law will be applied in ways that are acceptable to ordinary citizens, but it also assures that the content of that law will not become inaccessible to those citizens. Any law that has to be presented to a jury cannot be comprehensible only to a professional elite: either simplification or creative misunderstanding by jurors will render it accessible to those of ordinary training and experience. That is not a small virtue in a diverse democracy. Moreover, there's a strong historical case to be made for law reform through jury lawmaking. In the Middle Ages jurors regularly acquitted in the face of overwhelming evidence of homicide--because the only available penalty was capital and the circumstances suggested that was too severe a penalty for a death resulting from a drunken brawl. 54 Eventually, law capitulated to popular sentiment, with the graded system of criminal homicide as the result. Closer to our day, those of us old enough to remember the regime of contributory negligence understand that juries with some regularity disregarded the standard instruction that any amount of contributory negligence by the plaintiff defeated the claim entirely. Courts and legislatures eventually followed along with the regimes of comparative negligence that now prevail. The important thing about these changes is that they evolved from long experience of juries confronting facts that in which the common sense of justice departed from that dispensed by law--and law yielded. In a world where trials are increasingly rare, we lose some analogous opportunities for evolutionary lawmaking. household. 55 That's not a small problem for a democratic society.
Finally, we are encountering a problem that Galanter's paper nicely sketches: the dearth of good pricing information in a market that depends on accurate settlement prices.
Rational settlement requires a system of shadow prices against which settlements can be 35 to go to trial. A variation on this theme is the sliding-scale agreement (unlawful in some states) that guarantees plaintiff some amount but allows the settling defendant to reduce that payment by some or all of the recovery at trial against the remaining defendants.
Again, by eliminating the risk of a completely bad outcome at trial, the plaintiff has increased his willingness to undergo the risk of trial. One could imagine plaintiff's-side analogues to the Supreme Court's multiplier formula in Campbell, which would establish minimum amounts of pain and suffering (assuming a liability award), or a stronger statutory form that would establish tables for various injuries: by decreasing uncertainty, such steps would increase trial rates.
All of the variations sketched in the preceding two paragraphs decrease the range of trial outcomes and thus increase the potential rate of trials. A similar result might flow from a decrease in the size of the need for continuing investment. If my argument is correct, the aversion to trial results not only from uncertainty about outcome but also from the need to make continuing investments in the uncertain outcome. If that is correct, any changes that decrease the amount of such costs or the regularity of their occurrence has the potential for increasing parties' propensity to gamble on trial: less is at stake, and the human propensity to let sunk costs ride may cause litigants to hold on for trial. Just as in the days before discovery, a party with a one time, low, sunk-cost investment in a given case may have greater willingness to take a chance on trial outcomes. Such effects can result from developments entirely outside the procedural system. Some experienced civil practitioners suggest that digital technology may (once the technology is acquired) reduce some research and discovery costs. 65 If that is correct, one can imagine an effect on trial rates. Other sources tell a quite different story about technology, in which increased costs of conducting discovery in large digital environments drive the costs of discovery up rather than down--and thus would, according to my model of settlement dynamics--further decrease the rate of trials. 66 From a long-range perspective it matters less which happens that that we understand that changes exogenous to the procedural 36 system--changes ranging from the availability of credit to the creation of the digital technology--may affect trial rates.
C. Asking the Right Question
Let me turn, finally, to a different kind of concern--not with trial rates but with the underlying information produced by and about civil litigation. If there is a problem with the phenomena reported by Galanter, it may not be the trial rate but the absence of data that serve the same information function as trials. Trials produce not only resolutions of specific disputes, but also, in the aggregate, information about patterns of resolutions.
With enough trials, we have a range of values for a broken leg or a severed limb or consequential losses from a failure to deliver software. Those ranges should affect the settlement of other cases. Settlements deprive us of such information, and thus threaten to cannibalize their own legitimacy. If we live in a culture of settlement, it is important that we have sufficient information about settlement patterns to enable litigants to make rational judgments and to have some assurance that a particular settlement has a reasonable relation to other, similar ones. At present we lack this information. If one is concerned about this question, as Galanter suggests we should be, what's needed is something like a NASDAQ market quote system for settlements, in which reports of claim types are grouped and settlement figures reported. Such figures would vary substantially with the facts of each claim, and a system that went into significant detail would be impracticable, but even a crude form would yield substantially more information that most practitioners now enjoy. Such information now exists, but it is scattered and typically confidential. Insurers and very large self-insurers have it. So do plaintiffs' lawyers in the aggregate. But for reasons of strategic advantage and client attraction none of these holders presently has a motive to reveal this data; indeed, they have substantial incentives to conceal it.
One could, however, imagine conditioning access to the civil litigation system on an obligation to report settlement terms. (To allay concerns about confidentiality, one might agree to release the terms only in an aggregated form ("auto accident, broken leg" "product liability, severe burns and lifetime care," with identifying characteristics deleted.) It would be difficult and perhaps expensive to design such a national data bank, and there is no obvious payor, unless support for such a collection system were added as an additional dollar for each civil filing. But I echo Galanter in suggesting that the absence of such information costs plaintiffs and defendants alike, in the form of inefficiency (where perfectly sensible settlement proposals are rejected because of inaccurate information about "usual" settlements in the area in question) and injustice (where defendants pay aberrationally high or plaintiffs accept aberrationally low amounts). It may be that effort to collect and disseminate good settlement data would produce at lower cost and with less disruption some of the features of an increased rate of civil trials.
* * * * Civil litigation is both a system of public justice and a market for claims. Some of the debate surrounding civil trials occurs because observers insist that we must choose between a justice system and a market. That choice may be attractive in some academic circles, but it's not likely to occur in any real world that I can imagine. As a result, the real world choices will involve making the market work in a way that serves justice as nearly as may be and makes the justice system work in a way that does not destroy or distort the market. That is not an easy task, but it is the right one to contemplate.
(on file with author).
